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Abstract
We study an optimal control problem arising from a generalization of rock-
paper-scissors in which the number of strategies may be selected from any
positive odd number greater than 1 and in which the payoff to the winner
is controlled by a control variable γ. Using the replicator dynamics as the
equations of motion, we show that a quasi-linearization of the problem admits
a special optimal control form in which explicit dynamics for the controller
can be identified. We show that all optimal controls must satisfy a specific
second order differential equation parameterized by the number of strategies
in the game. We show that as the number of strategies increases, a limiting
case admits a closed form for the open-loop optimal control. In performing
our analysis we show necessary conditions on an optimal control problem
that allow this analytic approach to function.
Keywords: Cyclic Game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Optimal Control,
Lie Bracket
2010 MSC: 91A22, 92A15, 34D45
1. Introduction
Cyclic competition occurs frequently in nature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Cyclic
competition in coral reef populations are studied in [1]. Sinervo and Lively
first characterized rock-paper-scissors like competition in lizards [2], while
∗Corresponding author
Email addresses: griffinch@ieee.org (Christopher Griffin), jfan24@jhu.edu
(James Fan)
Preprint submitted to Mathematical Biosciences November 7, 2018
ar
X
iv
:1
71
0.
09
00
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  2
4 O
ct 
20
17
Gilg, Hanski and Sittler [4] study this behavior in rodents. Cyclic behavior
in microbial populations is studied in [3, 5, 6, 7]. In classical and evolutionary
game theory, cyclic dominance (e.g., matching pennies, rock-paper-scissors)
games are commonly studied [8, 9]. Biologically speaking, in an idealized
cyclic game, the absolute fitness measure (payoff) resulting from species in-
teraction can be represented by a circulant matrix, in which row k is a rota-
tion of row k− 1 for each k. Games with circulant payoff matrices have been
studied extensively in evolutionary game theory [10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]
and provide some of the most interesting behaviors [16].
In early work, cyclic interaction is considered without explicit reference
to games. Cyclic (chemo-biological) interactions are studied extensively in
[18, 19, 20] in which both competitive and cooperative behaviors are identi-
fied. Analysis of the replicator in which a circulant matrix emerges is studied
in [11] as a result of cyclic mass interaction kinetics. Zeeman [10] made an
early study of the dynamics of cyclic games showing that in rock-paper-
scissors a degenerate Hopf bifurcation leads to the emergence of a non-linear
center with no limit cycle possible in any 3 strategy game under the replicator
dynamics. Since this early work, several authors have investigated various
cyclic games and games characterized by circulant matrices. Among many
other works: Hofbauer and Schlag [15] consider imitation in cyclic games;
Diekmann and Gils specifically study the cyclic replicator dynamics and fo-
cus on the properties of low-dimensional cyclic games [14]; Ermentrout et
al. consider a transition matrix evolutionary dynamic in which a limit cycle
emerges in the rock-paper-scissors game [21]; and Griffin and Belmonte [22]
study a triple public goods game and show that is is diffeomorphic to gener-
alized rock-paper-scissors. Each of these works focuses explicitly on classes
of circulant games, while recent work by Granic´ and Kerns [17] characterizes
the Nash equilibria of arbitrary circulant games, but does not focus on the
evolutionary game context.
There has also been extensive work on spatial games with circulant pay-
off matrices. Peltoma¨ki and Alvara [23] consider both 3 and 4 state rock-
paper-scissors. Other papers consider rock-paper-scissors with variations on
reaction rate [24] or study the basins of attraction [25]. DeForest and Bel-
monte [26] study a fitness gradient variation on the spatial replicator and
show rock-paper-scissors can exhibit spatial chaos under these dynamics. Fi-
nally more recent work by Szczesny et. al [27] considers spiral formations in
rock-paper-scissors.
In this paper, we extend work in [22] by studying an optimal control prob-
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lem defined on a N -strategy (N = 3, 5, 7, . . . ) generalization of rock-paper-
scissors. Odd cardinality interactions are interesting because they model
specific biological cases [2, 4, 18, 19, 20]. Additionally, when N is very large,
these have the potential to model systems in which individuals a variety of
individuals with strengths and weaknesses interact.
In particular, the payoff matrix is (i) defined by the sum of two circulant
matrices, and (ii) admits a single control parameter. Thus we consider the
general class of control problems first studied in a specific case in [22]. Our
payoff matrix is inspired by the generalized rock-paper-scissors matrix defined
in [9]. Since every pair of heterogeneous strategic interactions (e.g., rock
vs. scissors) results in a non-zero payoff, we refer to this class of games as
complete odd circulant games.
The major results of this paper are:
1. We show that the complete odd circulant games admit only a unique
interior fixed point under the replicator dynamics. We also characterize
the fixed points of the N -strategy complete odd circulant game in terms
of the fixed points of the M < N complete odd circulant games.
2. We show that the replicator dynamics can be written as the sum of
an uncontrolled component and a controlled component both of which
have circulant Jacobian matrices.
3. As a consequence, we completely characterize the stability of the in-
terior fixed point and use this to define an optimal control problem
with objective to drive the system trajectories toward this interior fixed
point.
4. We describe the properties of a general class of control problems with a
vanishing Lie Bracket that will be used to analyze the control problem
we define. This suggests interesting geometric and algebraic connec-
tions between evolutionary games and optimal control theory. As a
by-product, we generalize recent control theoretic results in [28].
5. We show that a quasi-linearization of the control problem (as done
in [22]) has special form admitting a complete characterization of the
dynamics of the optimal control. We also derive a sufficient condition
on control optimality and thus completely generalize the results in [22]
to arbitrary complete odd circulant games.
6. As a part of the generalization, we find a limiting second order ordinary
differential equation (as N grows large) that the optimal control must
obey and show that it has a natural closed form solution.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we
present preliminary results and notation. In Section 3 we introduce the con-
trol problem of interest and study a general class of optimal control problems
that will assist in the derivation of our main results. Our main results on
control of complete odd circulant games are found in Section 4. Conclusions
and future directions are presented in Section 5.
2. Notation and Preliminary Results
A circulant matrix is a square matrix with form:
A =

a0 an−1 an−2 · · · a1
a1 a0 an−1 · · · a2
...
...
...
. . .
...
an−1 an−2 an−3 · · · a0
 .
A circulant matrix is entirely characterized by its first row and all other
rows are cyclic permutations of this first row. The set of N × N circulant
matrices forms a commutative algebra, a fact that will be used frequently in
this paper. Moreover, the eigenvalues of these matrices have special form. If
A is an N ×N circulant matrix and ω0, . . . , ωN−1 are the N th roots of unity,
then eigenvalue λj (j = 0, . . . , N − 1) is given by the expression:
λj = a0 + an−1ωj + an−2ω2j + · · ·+ a1ωN−1j .
Further details on this class of matrices is available in [29].
Let:
∆N =
{
u ∈ RN : 1Tu = 1,u ≥ 0}
be the unit N -simplex embedded in N -dimensional Euclidean space. Here 1
is an appropriately sized vector of 1’s and 0 is a zero vector.
We consider a family of control problems defined on parametrized cyclic
games with N = 2n+1 strategies, where n = 1, 2, . . . ,. If i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and
j ∈ Z, define:
µ(k) =
{
k mod N if k mod N 6= 0,
N otherwise.
(1)
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For the remainder of this paper, define LN ,MN ∈ RN×N so that:
LNij =
{
(−1)µ(N(i−1)+j−i) if i 6= j,
0 otherwise.
(2)
and
MNij =
{
1 if i 6= j and (−1)µ(N(i−1)+j−i) = 1,
0 otherwise.
(3)
By way of example, we illustrate the matrices L5 and M5 for the 5-strategy
cyclic game.
L5 =

0 −1 1 −1 1
1 0 −1 1 −1
−1 1 0 −1 1
1 −1 1 0 −1
−1 1 −1 1 0
 , M5 =

0 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0
 .
From a game-theoretic perspective, we can think of LN as being the tradi-
tional payoff matrix of the complete cyclic game with N strategies; e.g., the
payoff matrix of rock-paper-scissors. On the other hand, MN can be thought
of an actuating matrix that will determine whether the interior fixed point
of the complete cyclic game is stable or unstable, as we show in the sequel.
In the remainder of this paper, we will consider the generalized cyclic
game with N strategies where N = 3, 5, 7, . . . , and we note that both LN
and MN are circulant matrices. The payoff matrix for the generalized cyclic
game with N strategies and parameter γ is:
AN(γ) = LN + γMN .
If γ = 0 and N = 3, then A3(γ) is just the rock-paper-scissors matrix. With-
out loss of generality, we assume γ > −1. Otherwise, the natural winning
precedence in the cyclic game is reversed.
The matrix MN is the adjacency matrix of an N vertex circulant directed
graph G(MN), whose edge direction determines the winning precedence be-
tween two strategies in the underlying cyclic game. This is illustrated in
Figure 1. In particular, if MNij = 1, then Strategy i defeats Strategy j and
yields payoff 1 + γ in AN(γ).
5
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4
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(a) Five Strategy Game
1
2
3 4
5
6
7
(b) Seven Strategy Game
Figure 1: Five and seven strategy game represented as graphs.
In the control problem defined in the sequel, the replicator dynamics are
the nonlinear equations of motion with control parameter γ:
SN =
{
u˙i = ui
(
(ei − u)TAN(γ)u
)
,
u(0) = u0.
(4)
Here u = 〈u1, . . . , uN〉 is the vector denoting the proportion of the population
playing each of the N strategies. It is well known [12, 9] that if u0 ∈ ∆N ,
then u(t) is confined to ∆N for all time. For the remainder of this paper, we
assume u0 ∈ ∆N .
Assume m,n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , } and let M = 2m + 1 and N = 2n + 1. The
point-to-set mapping piM,N : ∆M → 2∂∆N maps a point u ∈ ∆M to the set of
points v in ∂∆N so that:
1. M elements of the vector v consist of the elements of u. The remaining
M −N elements are 0.
2. If the rows and columns of LN (resp. MN) corresponding to the zero-
entries in v are deleted to form the matrix L˜N (resp. M˜N), then
L˜N = LM (resp. M˜N = MM .
The second condition is equivalent to stating that the vertices correspond-
ing to the non-zero strategies in v induce a sub-graph of G(MN) that is
isomorphic to G(MM).
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Lemma 1. Let n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , } and N = 2n+ 1, then:
1. SN has among its fixed points ei ∈ ∆N (i = 1, . . . , N) and 1N 1 ∈
int(∆N).
2. Furthermore, if n > m ≥ 1, M = 2m + 1, and N = 2n + 1 and u+ is
a fixed point of SM , then piM,N(u+) are fixed points of SN .
Proof. To prove Statement 1, note first that pure strategies are always fixed
points of the replicator dynamics [9]. To see that u∗ = 1
N
1 is a fixed point,
note that:
LNu
∗ = 0,
γMNu
∗ = γ
n
N
1.
Consequently:
γ (u∗)T MNu∗ = γ
n
N
= γeTi MNu
∗.
The fact that u∗ = 1
N
1 is a fixed point follows immediately.
To prove Statement 2, suppose that u ∈ piM,N(u+) for some fixed point u+
of SM . Let L˜N and M˜N be the square sub-matrices of LN and MN obtained
by removing the rows and columns corresponding to the zero entries in u.
By assumption, it follows at once that:
(eTi − u)TAN(γ)u = (eTi − u+)TAM(γ)u+ = 0.
This completes the proof.
Corollary 2. The fixed point u∗ = 1
N
1 is the unique interior fixed point for
SN .
Proof. If u is any interior fixed point, then necessarily it must satisfy the
equation:
AN(γ)u = u
TAN(γ)u · 1.
Note that for any u ∈ ∆N , uTLu = 0. Therefore, u must satisfy:
AN(γ)u = γ · uTMNu · 1.
It is straight forward to compute:
uTMNu =
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
uiuj.
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We now proceed in cases. If γ = 0, then we solve:
LNu = 0,
1Tu = 1.
This system has rank n with n unknowns and therefore admits a unique
solution. Elementary row reduction shows that u∗ = 1
N
1 is the unique fixed
point in this case.
On the other hand, if γ 6= 0, then let:
α =
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
uiuj.
We can determine a relationship between the variables by solving:
AN(γ)u = α1.
Row-reduction on the system shows that when γ 6= 0 we obtain the relation-
ship:
u =
α
nγ
1. (5)
Consequently, u1 = u2 = · · · = uN and necessarily u∗ = 1N 1 is again the
unique interior fixed point. This completes the proof.
For the remainder of this paper, assume u∗ = 1
N
1 and let F,G : ∆N → Rn
be defined component-wise as:
Fi(u) = ui ((ei − u)LNu) , (6)
Gi(u) = ui ((ei − u)MNu) . (7)
The replicator dynamics are then:
u˙i = F(u) + γG(u),
which are the dynamics that will be used in the control problem of interest.
We note that F and G are the functional imprints of the standard payoff
matrix LN and the actuation matrix MN within the replicator framework.
Lemma 3. The Jacobian matrix of F evaluated at u∗ = 1
N
1 is:
J , DuF =
1
N
LN .
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Proof. We prove the result for Row 1 of DuF. The remainder of the argument
follows from the circulant structure of LN . We have:
F1(u) = u1e
T
1LNu,
because uTLNu = 0. Note:
u1e
T
1LNu = u1
(
N∑
j=2
(−1)j−1uj
)
. (8)
Differentiating with respect to u1 and evaluating at u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1N
yields:
[DuF]1,1 =
1
N
N∑
j=2
(−1)j−1 = 0,
since N is odd. Differentiating Expression 8 with respect to uj and evaluating
at u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1N yields:
[DuF]1,j =
(−1)j−1
N
=
1
N
LN1,j .
The result now follows from the fact that LN is a circulant matrix.
Lemma 4. The Jacobian matrix of G evaluated at u∗ = 1
N
1 is:
H , DuG =
1
N2
MN − 2n
N2
(1N −MN) = 1
N2
(N (MN − 1N) + 1N) ,
where 1N is an N ×N matrix of 1’s.
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 3, we show the result for Row 1 of DuG.
The remainder of the argument follows from the circulant structure of MN .
We have already noted in Corollary 2 that:
uTMNu =
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
uiuj.
We compute:
eT1MNu =
(N−1)/2∑
j=1
u2j+1.
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Differentiate with respect to k = 2j + 1 for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, corresponding to
a non-zero index in the first row of MN . We have:
∂G
∂uk
= u1
(
1−
(∑
j 6=k
uj
))
.
Evaluating at u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1N we obtain:
[DuG]1,k =
1
N
(
1− N − 1
N
)
=
1
N2
,
for k = 2j + 1 with j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Differentiate now with respect to u1 to
obtain:
∂G
∂u1
=
(N−1)/2∑
j=1
u2j+1 − 2
N∑
j=2
u1uj −
N∑
i=2
∑
j>i
uiuj. (9)
Evaluating at u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1N we obtain:
[DuG]1,1 =
n
N
− 2 2n
N2
− 1
N2
(
1
2
(N − 2)(N − 1)
)
=
−N2 − 2nN +N − 2
N2
= −2n
N
,
when 2n + 1 is substituted for N in the numerator. Finally, consider k 6= 1
and k 6= 2j+1 for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Differentiating with respect to uk we have:
∂G
∂uk
= −u1
(∑
j 6=k
uj
)
.
Evaluating at u1 = u2 = · · · = un = 1N we obtain:
[DuG]1,k = −
1
N2
(N − 1) = −2n
N
.
The result now follows from the fact that MN is a circulant matrix.
Theorem 5. If γ > 0, then the fixed point u∗ = 1
N
1 is asymptotically stable.
If γ < 0, then the fixed point u∗ is asymptotically unstable.
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Proof. From Lemmas 3 and 4, we note that the Jacobian matrix of SN at u∗
has the following form:
J = J+ γH = 1
N
LN + γ
(
1
N2
MN − 2n
N2
(1N −MN)
)
.
By its construction, it is a circulant matrix with first row given by:
J 1j =

−γ 2n
N2
if j = 1,
− 1
N
− γ 2n
N2
if j > 1 and j − 1 is odd,
1
N
+ γ 1
N2
otherwise.
(10)
Letting ωj for j = 0, . . . , N − 1 be the N th roots of unity,1, we know that the
jth eigenvalue of J is:
N∑
k=1
J 1,kωk−1j .
It now remains to show that the sign of the real-part of λj is entirely depen-
dent on γ. The real part of the eigenvalue is given by:
Re (λj) =
N∑
k=1
J 1,k cos
(
2pij(k − 1)
N
)
. (11)
The first eigenvalue (j = 0) is real and readily computed:
λ0 = n
(
γ
1
N2
− γ 2n
N2
)
− γ 2n
N2
= −γn(1 + 2n)
N2
.
It is clear at once that the sign of this eigenvalue is entirely controlled by the
sign of γ.
For j > 0, note that the periodicity of the cosine function (and the fact
that the roots of unity are the vertices of the regular unit N -gon) implies
that the coefficient of J 1,k is identical to the coefficient of J 1,N−(k−2) if
2 ≤ k ≤ n + 1. From this fact and the Expression 10, the sum in Equation
11 becomes:
Re (λj) = γ
(
− 2n
N2
+
n+1∑
k=2
cos
(
2pij(k − 1)
N
)(
1
N2
− 2n
N2
))
.
1For details see [29]
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Factoring further we see:
Re (λj) =
γ
N2
(
−2n+
n+1∑
k=2
cos
(
2pij(k − 1)
N
)
(1− 2n)
)
=
γ
N2
(
−2n+ (1− 2n)
(
n+1∑
k=2
cos
(
2pij(k − 1)
N
)))
.
The roots of unity are evenly distributed on the vertices of the unit N -gon
in C and therefore the sum of the real parts must be zero. It follows that:
n+1∑
k=2
cos
(
2pij(k − 1)
N
)
= −1
2
.
We now obtain an exact value for the real parts of the eigenvalues:
Re (λj) =
γ
N2
(
−2n− 1
2
(1− 2n)
)
= − γ
N2
(
n+
1
2
)
. (12)
Thus we have proved that when γ > 0, then Re(λj) < 0 for all j and if
γ < 0, then Re(λj) > 0. The asymptotic stability (resp. instability) of the
fixed point follows immediately.
We illustrate the attractive interior point of the five and seven strategy
cyclic games by projecting them into regular N -gons (N = 5, 7), shown in
Figure 2. A pure strategy corresponds to a vertex, while a mixed strategy
is located in the interior. Note, these are not true trajectories as would be
seen in a classic ternary plot on the three rock-paper-scissors, but they are
similarly representative.
3. The Control Problem and Some General Results
We now state our control problem of interest:
CN =

min
∫ tf
0
1
2
‖u− u∗‖2 + r
2
γ2 dt
s.t. u˙ = F(u) + γG(u),
u(0) = u0.
(13)
12
12
3
4
5
(a) Five Strategies
1
2
7
3
6
4
5
(b) Seven Strategies
Figure 2: A figure illustrating the attraction of the unique interior fixed point of the cyclic
game when γ = 1 assuming 5 and 7 strategies. The trajectories are projected into regular
N -gons (N = 5, 7). The closer a trajectory is to a vertex, the closer it is to that pure
strategy.
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where u∗ = 1
N
1. Such a problem arises naturally if we consider species inter-
acting in a cyclic manner and γ is a costly control mechanism by which an
external manager may control species populations. In [22], γ arises naturally
as a tax in a public-goods game, which is shown to be diffeomorphic to a three
stragegy cyclic game. As in [22], we will show that a quasi-linearization of
this control problem has special structure. In this case, however, we show
this special structure holds for all cyclic games (i.e., for all N = 2n + 1).
Furthermore, we discuss the limiting behavior of the control as N grows
large. To do this, we first consider a very general optimal control problem
and obtain necessary conditions for simplifying the Euler-Lagrange necessary
conditions. We then use these simplifications to generalize the results in [22].
3.1. Control Problems with One Control and Vanishing Lie Bracket
In the remainder of this section, the functions F,G : Rn → Rn are arbi-
trary smooth functions, rather than the functions specific to the replicator
dynamics for cyclic games given in Equations 6 and 7, x ∈ Rn is a state
vector, and γ is the control function to be determined.
Consider the general optimal control problem with form:
min Ψ(x(tf )) +
∫ tf
0
F0(x) + γG0(x) +
r
2
γ2 dt
s.t. x˙ = F(x) + γG(x),
x(0) = x0.
(14)
The functions F0, G0 : Rn → R are smooth. Let r > 0, tf be the terminal
time, and F0(x) be convex. Expression 13 has this structure, so we are simply
considering a more general case of our problem of interest.
The Euler-Lagrange necessary conditions for control are simple to derive
for this problem and have an almost linear behavior. Note the Hamiltonian
is:
H(x, γ,λ) = F0(x) + γG0(x) + r
2
γ2 + λTF(x) + γλTG(x). (15)
The Hamiltonian is (strictly) convex in the control γ, and thus we propose
the following:
Lemma 6. Any solution γ∗ to Hγ = 0 satisfies the necessary conditions:
1. Hγ = 0, and
2. Hγγ > 0, the strong Legendre-Clebsch condition;
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therefore, it minimizes the Hamiltonian at all times.
Deriving the optimal control by solving ∂H/∂γ = 0 for u to obtain:
γ∗ = −1
r
(
λTG(x) +G0(x)
)
. (16)
The two conditions in Lemma 6, along with the fact that x∗ and λ∗ solve the
resulting Euler-Lagrange two-point boundary value problem (see Expression
18), form the complete set of necessary conditions for the optimal control
problem. Adding in the additional requirement that the corresponding ma-
trix Riccati equation is bounded on [0, tf ], these form sufficient conditions for
a weak local minimal optimal controller [30, 31]. We discuss this sufficient
condition in the sequel.
For simplicity, we refer to the optimal control as γ (rather than γ∗) in the
remainder of this paper and assume it is given by Equation 16. The adjoint
dynamics are:
λ˙T = −(∇xF0(x))T − γ(∇xG0(x))T − λTDxF− γλTDxG, (17)
where DxF is the Jacobian (with respect to x). Thus we have the Euler-
Lagrange two-point boundary value problem:
x˙ = F(x) + γG(x),
λ˙ = −∇xF0(x)− γ∇xG0(x)− (DxF)Tλ− u(DxG)Tλ,
x(0) = x0,
λ(tf ) = ∇xΨ(x[tf ]). (Transverality Condition)
(18)
Proposition 7. If u∗ is an optimal control, then:
γ(tf ) = −1
r
(∇xΨ(x(tf ))TG(x(tf )) +G0(x(tf ))) . (19)
Proof. This follows from the transversality condition.
From Equation 16, note that:
rγ˙ = −λ˙TG(x)− λT (DxG)x˙− (∇xG0)x˙. (20)
Then:
rγ˙ =
(
(∇xF0(x))T + γ(∇xG0(x))T + λT (DxF) + γλT (DxG)
)
G(x)−
λT (DxG) (F(x) + γG(x))− (∇xG0) (F(x) + γG(x)) . (21)
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Simplifying we have:
rγ˙ = (∇xF0(x))TG(x)−(∇xG0(x))TF(x)+λT ((DxF)G(x)− (DxG)F(x)) .
If the Lie Bracket vanishes, i.e.,:
[F,G] = (DxF)G− (DxG)F = 0, (22)
then this simplifies to:
γ˙ =
1
r
(
(∇xF0(x))TG(x)− (∇xG0(x))TF(x)
)
, (23)
and all co-state variables are eliminated. We have shown the following:
Theorem 8. Consider the general optimal control problem given in Expres-
sion 14. If [F,G] = 0 and γ is an optimal control, then the pair (x(γ), γ) is
a solution of the two point boundary value problem:
x˙ =F(x) + γG(x),
γ˙ =
1
r
(
(∇xF0(x))TG(x)− (∇xG0(x))TF(x)
)
,
x(0) =x0,
γ(tf ) =− 1
r
(∇xΨ(x(tf ))TG(x(tf )) +G0(x(tf ))) .
(24)
Geometrically, Equation 22 implies that the flows derived by the vector
fields F and G commute locally. From a game-theoretic view, this means
that locally evolutionary motion caused by competition in uncontrolled game
commutes with evolutionary motion caused by the actuation payoffs on local
space/time scales. As we see in the sequel, this is not true for actuated
cyclic games, but is true for quasi-linear approximations of the evolutionary
dynamics as in [22].
It is worth noting that a differential equation for the control function is
derived in [32], without the assumption of the vanishing Lie Bracket. How-
ever, without this assumption the system does not simplify in as useful a
way and, in fact, in [32] the relevant Lie Bracket is not considered. Note,
in formulating Theorem 8, we are assuming that solving the Euler-Lagrange
equations will yield an optimal control. We can use the well known fact that
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a sufficient condition for optimality is the boundedness of the solution to the
matrix Ricatti equation [30, 31] to derive a complete necessary and sufficient
condition for optimality of the control. Let:
x˙ = F(x) + γG(x) = f(x, γ).
Then the Matrix Ricatti equation is:
−S˙ = DxxH + (Dxf)TS+ S(Dxf)−
1
r
(
DγxH + (∂γf)TS
)T (
DγxH + (∂γf)TS
)
,
S(tf ) = ∇2xΨ(x[tf ]).
(25)
Here Dxx is the second differential operator with respect to the state and
∂γ is an ordinary partial derivative, since there is only one control variable.
When taken together with Lemma 6, the system of differential equations
in Theorem 8 and the co-state dynamics, Equation 17, we have a complete
characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal
control. This yields the corollary:
Corollary 9 (Corollary to Theorem 8). Let f(x, γ) = F(x) + γG(x) in the
optimal control problem in Expression 14, with Hamiltonian H(x, γ,λ). Any
solution to the system of differential equations:
x˙ = f(x, γ),
γ˙ =
1
r
(
(∇xF0(x))TG(x)− (∇xG0(x))TF(x)
)
,
λ˙ = −∇xF0(x)− γ∇xG0(x)− (DxF)Tλ− u(DxG)Tλ,
−S˙ = DxxH + (Dxf)TS+ S(Dxf)−
1
r
(
DγxH + (∂γf)TS
)T (
DγxH + (∂γf)TS
)
,
x(0) = x0,
γ(tf ) = −1
r
(∇xΨ(x(tf ))TG(x(tf )) +G0(x(tf ))) ,
λ(tf ) = ∇xΨ(x[tf ]),
S(tf ) = ∇2xΨ(x[tf ]),
(26)
in which γ(t) = −1
r
(
λTG[x] +G0[x]
)
and S is bounded for all t ∈ [0, tf ]
constitutes a weak local optimal solution for Expression 14.
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We note that this is the general analog of Proposition 2 in [28], which is
specialized to a one-dimensional control problem. In general, checking the
boundedness of the solution to the Matrix Ricatti equation must be done
numerically. In the sequel we develop a simpler test for optimality using
Mangasarian’s sufficiency condition; i.e., by checking that the Hamiltonian
is jointly convex.
Problem 13 (CN) does not satisfy the necessary condition that [F,G] = 0.
However, a quasi-linearization of the problem does satisfy this condition (as
in [22]). We now discuss a special case of Theorem 8 as well as extensions
that apply to this quasi-linearized form.
3.2. The Quasi-Linear Case
For the remainder of this section, let J and H be arbitrary matrices of
appropriate size, rather than the Jacobian matrices derived in Lemmas 3 and
4.
In Problem 14, let: 
F0(x) =
1
2
xTQx,
G0(x) = 0,
F(x) = Jx,
G(x) = Hx.
(27)
where Q is a (symmetric) positive definite matrix of appropriate size. We
will add additional criteria to J and H as we proceed. We refer to this as a
quasi-linear case because the only non-linearity arises from the interaction of
the state and control variables. The following Corollary is immediate from
Theorem 8:
Corollary 10. If JH = HJ and γ∗ is an optimal control, then the pair
(x(γ∗), γ∗) is a solution of the two point boundary value problem:
x˙ =Jx+ γHx,
γ˙ =
1
r
xTQHx,
x(0) =x0,
γ(tf ) =− 1
r
∇xΨ(x(tf ))THx(tf ).
(28)
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The condition that J andH commute is exactly the statement that the Lie
Bracket of the vector fields in the dynamics vanishes. Therefore, Theorem
8 can be applied to any linear quadratic control problem where the state
equation satisfies this condition.
We now derive some special results on γ¨ and the optimal control in this
quasi-linear case. Let K , QH and assume JH = HJ. Computing the
second derivative of γ yields:
rγ¨ = x˙TKx+ xTKx˙ =
(
xTJT + γxTHT
)
Kx+ xTK (Jx+ γHx) =
xT
(
JTK+KJ+ γ
(
HTK+KH
))
x.
To simplify this, we will add an additional assumption to J; suppose that
JT = −J (i.e., J is skew-symmetric) and JK = KJ. Then:
r
γ¨
γ
= xT
(
HTK+KH
)
x. (29)
Before proceeding note that:
d
dt
(
xTQx
)
=
(
xTJT + γxTHT
)
Qx+ xTQ (Jx+ γHx) =
xT (−JQ+QJ)x+ γxT (HTQ+QH)x =
xT (−JQ+QJ)x+ γxT (HTQT +QH)x =
xT (−JQ+QJ)x+ 2γxTKx =
xT (−JQ+QJ)x+ 2rγγ˙.
Thus, we have the following proposition and its corollary:
Proposition 11. If J = −JT , JH = HJ and JQ = QJ and K , QH,
then:
1.
JK = KJ,
2.
d
dt
(
xTQx
)
= 2rγγ˙, (30)
3.
r
γ¨
γ
= xT
(
HTK+KH
)
x. (31)
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Corollary 12. For some constant C,
xTQx = rγ2 + C (32)
is the implicit closed-loop control, where C must satisfy:
C = xT (tf )Qx(tf )− r
(
1
r
∇xΨ(x(tf ))THx(tf )
)2
. (33)
Furthermore the optimal control γ exists at time t just in case:
xT (t)Qx(t)− C ≥ 0. (34)
4. Application to Complete Odd Circulant Games
We now return to the study of cyclic games with N strategies and specif-
ically to the control problem in Expression 13. As noted already, we cannot
apply Theorem 8 directly to Problem 13 because the appropriate Lie Bracket
does not vanish. However, we can construct the quasi-linearized form of the
problem. Let x = u− u∗. The quasi-linearized problem is:
C˜N =

min
∫ tf
0
1
2
‖x‖2 + r
2
γ2 dt
s.t. x˙ = Jx+ γHx,
x(0) = x0.
(35)
In Expression 35, J and H are the Jacobian matrices of F(u) and G(u) as
defined in Lemmas 3 and 4. Problem 35 is an instance of the general control
problem studied in Section 3.
The following useful fact follows at once from Lemma 3.
Corollary 13. The Jacobian matrix J is skew-symmetric.
Lemma 14. Let γ be the optimal control for Problem 13. Then:
1. The (open-loop) optimal control obeys the following differential equa-
tions:
γ˙ =
1
r
xTHx, γ(tf ) = 0, (36)
r
γ¨
γ
= xT
(
HTH+HH
)
x. (37)
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2. The following identity holds:
xTx = ‖x‖2 = rγ2 + C, (38)
where:
C = ‖x(tf )‖2 .
Proof. Problem 35 is an instance of Problem 14, but with quasi-linear system
dynamics and quadratic objective as given in the quasi-linear conditions in
Expression 27. In particular, Problem 35 sets Q = IN . As a consequence the
matrix K = QH = H. From Corollary 13, we know J is skew-symmetric.
Further, since the circulant matrices form a commutative algebra, we have
HJ = JH. The lemma follows at once from Corollary 10, Proposition 11
and Corollary 12.
Expression 38 is the closed-loop control law for the controlled cyclic game.
Furthermore, Equation 36 allows us to determine some structural properties
of γ.
Proposition 15. The matrix H is negative definite and therefore γ˙ ≤ 0 for
all t.
Proof. Consider any vector x ∈ RN . Then:
xTHx =
1
N2
xT (N (MN − 1N) + 1N)xT =
1
N2
(
N
(
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj −
N∑
i=1
x2i − 2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj
)
+
N∑
i=1
x2i + 2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj
)
=
− N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
x2i −
N − 2
N2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj.
Let S ∈ RN×N be the upper-triangular matrix defined as:
Sij =
{
−N−1
N2
if i = j,
−N−2
N2
otherwise.
Then:
xTHx = xTSx = −N − 1
N2
N∑
i=1
x2i −
N − 2
N2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj.
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The leading principal minors of S alternate in sign (the diagonal is entirely
negative) and thus by Sylvester’s criterion, S is negative definite. It follows
at once that xTHx < 0 for all x 6= 0 and thus H is negative definite. The
fact that γ˙ < 0 now follows from Lemma 14.
Corollary 16. The optimal control γ is a decreasing function on [0, tf ].
In addition to determining that γ is decreasing, Problem 35 has further
special structure, which allows us to understand the structure of the derived
control γ in greater detail and ultimately derive a closed-form approximation
for large N . The derivation is similar to the one found in [22] for a special
case diffeomorphic to rock-paper-scissors.
Lemma 17. Let H = DuG(u). Then for all x ∈ RN :
xT
(
HTH+HH+H
)
x = − n
N2
‖x‖2 . (39)
Proof. From Lemma 4 we have:
H =
1
N2
(N (MN − 1N) + 1N) .
Let R = MN − 1N . The following computations are straight forward:
HTH =
1
N4
(
N2RTR+NRT1N +N1
T
NR+ 1
T
N1N
)
,
HH =
1
N4
(
N2RR+NR1N +N1NR+ 1N1N
)
.
Note that:
1TN1N = 1N1N = N1N .
We may also compute:
1NMN = 1
T
NMN = n1N ,
because MN contains n unit entries in each column (row). Consequently:(
MTN1N
)T
= 1TMN = n1N ,
and therefore:
MTN1N = n1
T
N = n1N .
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Using this information, we compute:
RT1N = 1
T
NR = 1NR = R1N = −(n+ 1)1N . (40)
Thus:
HTH+HH =
1
N4
(
N2
(
RT +R
)
R− 4N(n+ 1)1N + 2N1N
)
=
1
N4
(
N2
(
RT +R
)
R− 2N (2(n+ 1)− 1)1N
)
=
1
N2
(
N2
(
RT +R
)
R− 2N21N
)
=
1
N2
((
RT +R
)
R− 21N
)
.
Using the fact that H = (NR+ 1N)/N
2, we may write:
HTH+HH+H =
1
N2
((
RT +R+NIN
)
R− 1N
)
.
The circulant structure of M implies the identity:
MT +M = 1N − IN .
Therefore:
RT +R = 1N − IN − 21N = −1N − IN .
Thus, using Equation 40 and the fact that N − 1 = 2n:
HTH+HH+H =
1
N2
(((N − 1)IN − 1N)R− 1N) =
1
N2
((N − 1)(MN − 1N) + (n+ 1)1N − 1N) =
1
N2
(2nMN +−n1N) = n
N2
(2MN − 1N) .
Recall from Corollary 2 that:
xTMNx =
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj.
Furthermore, it is straight forward to compute:
xT1Nx =
N∑
i=1
x2i + 2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj.
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Therefore:
xT
(
HTH+HH+H
)
x =
n
N2
xT (2MN − 1N)x =
n
N2
(
2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj −
N∑
i=1
x2i − 2
N∑
i=1
∑
j>i
xixj
)
= − n
N2
‖x‖2 .
This completes the proof.
Theorem 18. If γ is the open-loop optimal control for Problem 35, then γ
satisfies the following second order differential equation:
rγ¨ + rγγ˙ +
n
N2
γ
(
rγ2 + C
)
= 0,
γ(tf ) = 0,
γ′(0) =
1
r
xT0Hx0,
C = ‖x(tf )‖2 .
(41)
Proof. From Lemma 14 we have:
r
γ¨
γ
= xT
(
HTH+HH
)
x,
and
rγ˙ = xTHx.
Adding these together we obtain:
r
γ¨
γ
+ rγ˙ = xT
(
HTH+HH+H
)
x.
Therefore by Lemma 17:
r
γ¨
γ
+ γ˙ = − n
N2
‖x(t)‖2 .
From Lemma 14, we have:
r
γ¨
γ
+ γ˙ = − n
N2
(
rγ2 + C
)
,
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where C = ‖x(tf )‖2. Thus:
rγ¨ + γγ˙ +
n
N2
γ
(
rγ2 + C
)
= 0.
The boundary conditions γ(0) = 0 and γ′(0) = xT0Hx0 follows from Lemma
14.
Corollary 19. For N large, the open loop control γ can be approximated by
ζ, a solution to the following two-point boundary value problem:
rζ¨ + rζζ˙ = 0,
ζ(tf ) = 0,
ζ ′(0) =
1
r
xT0Hx0.
(42)
In practice, we will show that N ≥ 5 is sufficient for this approximation
to be valid.
4.1. Closed Form Analysis of the Limiting Behavior
For simplicity, let r = 1 in the following analysis. Corollary 19 can
be made more useful by re-writing Equation 42 as a system of first order
differential equations and examining the phase portrait (see Fig. 3):
ζ˙ = v,
v˙ = −ζv,
ζ(tf ) = 0,
v(0) = xT0Hx0.
(43)
The phase portrait indicates a sharp behavioral change in the direction field
when moving from the v < 0 half-plane to the v > 0 half-plane. For the
half-plane where v < 0, γ ≥ 0 necessarily by Theorem 5. This is consistent
with Proposition 15.
System 43 has a closed form solution2 with several branches. The relevant
2Derived with MathematicaTM.
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Figure 3: The phase portrait of the first order system representing the limiting behavior
of the open loop control γ and it’s first derivative.
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solutions on the interval [0, tf ] are:
ζ(t) =
√
2
√
κ tanh2
(√
κ (tf − t)√
2
)
,
ζ ′(t) = −2√κ
√
κ tanh2
(√
κ (tf − t)√
2
)
csch
(√
2
√
κ (tf − t)
)
.
Note, ζ ∼ O(| tanh(·)|). Thus, the usual behavior of tanh is modified so that
ζ is a decreasing function on [0, tf ] and then an increasing function outside
this range. As a consequence, this solution is only valid on the control domain
of interest.
In the closed form solution, κ is a constant of integration that must be
chosen so that v(0) = ζ ′(0) = xT0Hx0. Finding a closed form expression
for κ is difficult. However as N increases, xT0Hx0 decreases in size because
H ∼ 1/N and ‖x‖ is bounded, since x is just a translation of u ∈ ∆N . For
small values of xT0Hx0, we expect κ to be small because of the structure of
ζ ′(t). Furthermore, ζ ′(0) can be approximated as:
γ′(0) ≈ −κ+O(κ2).
Thus, setting κ = −xT0Hx0 will give a reasonable approximation of the
solution, as we illustrate in the examples below.
4.2. Sufficiency of the Euler-Lagrange Conditions
Corollary 9 contains both necessary and sufficient conditions for the com-
puted γ(t) to be the optimal control. However, these conditions require the
solution of the matrix Riccati equation. For the quasi-linearized optimal
control problem on cyclic games, a simpler test can be constructed using
Mangaserian’s condition, which states that the Hessian of the Hamiltonian
must be positive definite (i.e., jointly convex in state and control). For the
optimal control in quasi-linearized cyclic games, the Hamiltonian of this op-
timal control problem is:
H(x, γ,λ) = ‖x‖2 + 1
r
γ2 + λTJx+ γλTHx.
This is a specialization of Equation 15 to the quasi-linearized cyclic games
problem. The Hessian of H is:
H =
[
IN H
TλT
λH r
]
.
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Here, λ is the co-state for the optimal control problem.
Theorem 20. If r >
∥∥HTλT∥∥2 for all t ∈ [0, tf ], then the control derived in
Lemma 14 is optimal.
Proof. The Hessian matrix H is positive definite if and only if it has a
Cholesky decomposition, which then implies that H(x, γ,λ) is convex in
both its state and control. Computing the Cholesky decomposition for H we
obtain:
H =
[
IN 0
λTH
√
r − ‖HTλT‖2
][
IN H
TλT
0
√
r − ‖HTλT‖2
]
.
This decomposition exists if and only if r >
∥∥HTλT∥∥2. The result follows
immediately.
As we demonstrate in the examples, this sufficient condition for optimality
is precisely the one identified in [22] for the triple public goods game, which
was shown to be diffeomorphic to the cyclic game with three strategies (rock-
paper-scissors).
4.3. Examples with N = 3, 5, 7, 9
We study the derived optimal controls for the case when N = 3, 5, 7, 9
in both the fully non-linear optimal control problem and the quasi-linearized
optimal control problem. In particular we observe similar structure to the
optimal controls in all cases. For these examples, we set tf = 6, except in
the last case where we extend it to show an example where the sufficient
condition for optimality is not satisfied.
In Figure 4 we show the optimal control for both the non-linear and
quasi-linearized optimal control problems. We set r = 0.2 and the initial
state u0 = (0.2333, 0.3333, 0.43333), which is close enough to the fixed point
for the quasi-linearized approximation to be valid. We also demonstrate
the equivalence between the solution to the quasi-linearized Euler-Lagrange
equations and the second order differential equation (Eq. 41). We also show
the approximation to the quasi-linearized control function that arises as a
solution to Equation 42. In the 3 strategy case, the condition for optimality
is:
r >
∥∥HTλT∥∥2 = 1
9
‖λ‖2 . (44)
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Figure 4: The control function, its approximations and the
∥∥HTλT∥∥2, used in determining
whether the solution to the necessary conditions are sufficient for an optimal control for
the 3 strategy cyclic game (rock-paper-scissors).
This is not generally true, but it is equivalent to the sufficient condition
derived in [22] for the diffeomorphic triple public goods game. Thus, Theorem
20 generalizes the results from [22].
In Figure 5 we show the relevant control plots for the 5 strategy cyclic
game (rock-paper-scissors-Spock-lizard3). We again use r = 0.2 and set
u0 = (0.1, 0.3, 0, 0.1, 0.3). An interesting feature of the 5 strategy cyclic
game is that the limiting approximation (Equation 42) does not perform as
well as it did for the 3 strategy game. As we see in Figures 6 and 7, the
approximation does improve (as we expect) as N increases. This anomalous
behavior may be a function of numerical instability or a property of the 5
strategy cyclic game. We do note that because of the properties of Equations
41 and 42 (i.e, branching solutions), we did observe some numerical instability
when simulating these systems. We note that in the 5 strategy case, the
sufficient condition on optimality is satisfied.
In Figures 6 and 7 we illustrate the optimal control for 7 and 9 strategy
games. In these cases r = 0.2 again. To maintain feasibility of the starting
solution, we set u0 by alternately adding and subtracting 0.05 from the equi-
librium, but kept the third strategy at proportion 1/N in both cases. Thus
3Developed by Sam Kass. See http://www.samkass.com/theories/RPSSL.html or
Episode 8, Season 2 of The Big Bang Theory. Note, to properly organize the moves to
produce a circulant matrix, the strategies should be ordered as rock-paper-scissors-Spock-
lizard rather than rock-paper-scissors-lizard-Spock as they are on The Big Bang Theory.
Kass correctly organizes the strategies.
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Figure 5: The control function, its approximations and the
∥∥HTλT∥∥2, used in determining
whether the solution to the necessary conditions are sufficient for an optimal control for
the 5 strategy cyclic game (rock-paper-scissors-Spock-lizard).
we assured u0 was in ∆N in both cases. As we expect, as N increases, the
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Figure 6: The control function, its approximations and the
∥∥HTλT∥∥2, used in determining
whether the solution to the necessary conditions are sufficient for an optimal control for
the 7 strategy cyclic game.
approximation in Equation 42 improves. It is also interesting to note that
the general structure of the optimal control function is similar in all cases
with the quasi-linearized control. It exhibits almost linear behavior, and the
fully non-linear controller shows decreasing oscillation. That the optimal
controller is a decreasing function is consistent with Proposition 15.
We can analyze the control problem even when the starting state is not
near the fixed point, which yields a case where the sufficient condition for op-
timality fails to hold. We again consider the case when N = 3 and extend the
time horizon of control to tf = 15. We start at the point u0 = (0.8, 0.1, 0.1),
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Figure 7: The control function, its approximations and the
∥∥HTλT∥∥2, used in determining
whether the solution to the necessary conditions are sufficient for an optimal control for
the 9 strategy cyclic game.
which is not near the equilibrium point u∗ = 1
3
1, thus reducing the accu-
racy of the quasi-linearized approximation. The objective of this example is
to study both the extended time control horizon as well as the control that
results when the starting point is further from the equilibrium point.
We compute an optimal control using the fully non-linear Euler-Lagrange
equations, the Euler-Lagrange equations for the quasi-linearized system, and
the exact differential equation for γ given in Lemma 14. As demonstrated
in Figure 8, the quasi-linearized control functions are identical to each other
(as expected), and they are highly correlated to the control function for the
fully non-linear system. The co-state, however does not satisfy the sufficient
condition r > HTλ. Here r = 0.2, as in the previous examples. We can
still analyze this problem by solving the matrix Riccati equation as given in
Theorem 8 to show that it is bounded, and thus the control identified for
the quasi-linearized system is optimal. The matrix Riccati equation for this
system is:
−S˙ = I3 + (J+ γH)T S+ S (J+ γH)−
1
r
(
λTH+ xTHTS
)T (
λTH+ xTHTS
)
,
S(tf ) = 0.
This system of equations contains nine equations because S is 3 × 3. As
shown in Figure 8, the solution curves for this equation are all bounded
on the time interval of consideration. Furthermore, since the state and co-
state necessarily satisfy the Euler-Lagrange equations, and the Hamiltonian
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Figure 8: A solution that violates the sufficient condition for optimality r > HTλ but can
be shown to be optimal by appealing to the matrix Riccatti equation, which has bounded
solutions for t ∈ [0, tf ]. We compare the solution to the ordinary controller derived from
the ordinary Euler-Lagrange equations and the controller that is directly computed using
Lemma 14. Note they are identical as expected.
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is convex in γ and γ (and therefore maximizes the Hamiltonian at all times
(see Lemma 6)), the control function must be (locally) optimal.
Note that while the starting point in this example is not near the equilib-
rium point, the control computed for the quasi-linear approximation is still
highly correlated to the control computed for the non-linear system. Thus,
in this case quasi-linearization still provides a reasonable approximation to
the optimal control in the non-linear system.
5. Final Discussion and Future Directions
In this paper we studied an optimal control problem arising from the
class of complete, odd circulant games that generalize rock-paper-scissors.
We used the replicator dynamics as the natural equations of motion in the
optimal control problem. In particular, the control problem was to drive
trajectories toward the unique interior fixed point of the replicator dynam-
ics. We first studied the uncontrolled fixed points of the replicator. We then
showed that this class of problems admits a natural quasi-linearization, and
that this quasi-linearized optimal control problem has a open-loop optimal
control satisfying a specific second order differential equation. Furthermore,
we showed that as the number of strategies grows, this differential equation
admits a closed form solution. Numerical comparisons showed that this lim-
iting case provides a natural approximation for the optimal control. We also
showed that even when the starting conditions for the optimal control are far
from the interior Nash equilibrium, where quasi-linearization is performed,
we still can use it to approximate the optimal control in the original problem.
Unfortunately, the results presented in this paper do not apply to arbi-
trary circulant games or to cyclic games with a control parameter. In this
context, a cyclic game is any circulant game in which the first row of the LN
matrix has form (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0,−1). Here the number of 0’s between 1 and −1
is N −3. The resulting matrix MN with 1’s corresponding to the 1′ in L and
0 elsewhere is the adjacency matrix of a cycle graph. Rock-paper-scissors is
the only game that is both a cyclic and complete odd circulant graph (be-
cause the three-cycle is the complete graph on three vertices). Any circulant
game whose payoff matrix can be written as LN + γMN will obey Equation
36 because the circulant matrices form a commutative algebra. Beyond that,
it is possible addition dynamics govern the optimal controls in these cases.
This presents a logical area for further study.
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Another logical extension of this work is to study circulant games with
an off-center interior equilibrium point, rather than u∗ = 1
N
1. Doing so,
however, should introduce additional control parameters. This would be
an interesting extension as well since this paper considered only a single
control parameter. It also will make the application more realistic since an
individual may have varying degrees of control over each population. In
addition to introducing additional controls, another natural extension of this
work is to derive controllers that drive the system toward a non-interior
equilibrium point. In particular it would be intriguing to study the problem
of deliberately eliminating one or more species.
Finally, studying more complex dynamics with control, like the mutator-
replicator, may produce interesting and useful results. However, these may
not admit the necessary conditions to allow the control mechanisms identified
in this paper to be applied.
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Appendix A. Optimal Control Problems
In Section 3 we introduce the problem of driving a population playing
a cyclic game to its mixed strategy equilibrium. We present key facts from
optimal control theory used in this study. Details are available in [33, 34, 35].
A Bolza type optimal control problem is an optimization problem of the
form: 
min Ψ(x(tf )) +
∫ tf
t0
f(x(t),u(t), t)dt
s.t. x˙ = g(x(t),u(t), t),
x(0) = x0.
(A.1)
When Ψ(x(tf )) ≡ 0, this is called a Lagrange type optimal control problem.
The vector of variables x is called the state, while the vector of decision
variables u is called the control. Additional constraints on u, x or the joint
function of x and u can be added.
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The Hamiltonian with adjoint variables (Lagrange multipliers) λ for this
problem is:
H(x,λ, u) = f(x(t),u(t), t) + λTg(x(t),u(t), t).
In what follows, we assume that all f(x,u, t) and g(x,u, t) are continuous
and differentiable in x and u, and Ψ(x(tf )) is continuous and differentiable in
x(tf ). A proof of this lemma can be found in almost every book on optimal
control (e.g. [35]).
Lemma 21 (Necessary Conditions of Optimal Control). If u∗ is a solution
to Optimal Control Problem (A.1), then there is a vector of adjoint variables
λ∗ so that:
H(x∗(t),u∗(t),λ∗(t)) ≤ H(x∗(t),u(t),λ∗(t)) (A.2)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for all admissible inputs u, and the following conditions
hold:
1. Pontryagin’s Minimim Principle: u˙(t) = ∂H
∂u
= 0 and ∂
2H
∂u2
is positive
definite,
2. Co-State Dynamics:
λ˙(t) = −∂H
∂x
= −λT (t)∂g(x,u)
∂x
+
∂f(x,u)
∂x
,
3. State Dynamics: x˙(t) = ∂H
∂λ
= g(x,u),
4. Initial Condition: x(0) = x0, and
5. Transversality Condition: λ(tf ) =
∂Ψ
∂x
(x(tf )).
We will use the following restricted form of Mangasarian’s Sufficiency
condition [33] to argue a controller we derive in Section 4 is the optimal
controller.
Lemma 22 (Mangasarian’s Sufficiency Condition - Restricted Form). Sup-
pose (x∗,u∗) satisfies the necessary conditions from Lemma 21 and H is
jointly convex in x and u for all time, and Ψ(x(tf )) ≡ 0. Then (x∗,u∗) is a
globally optimal control in the sense that it minimizes the objective functional.
We note that Mangasarian’s Sufficiency Condition specifically implies the
strong Legendre-Clebsch necessary conditions for optimality of the control:
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1. Hu = 0, and
2. Huu < 0.
In the paper, we also discuss the sufficiency of the boundedness of the matrix
Riccati equation. Since this plays only a small role in our overall analysis,
we introduce this when it is needed.
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